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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
LARRY MYERS, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
9955 
The appellant has appealed from a conviction in the 
Second Judicial District upon jury trial of the charge of 
issuing a check against insufficient funds, in violation of 
76-20-11, U. C. A. 1953. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The defendant was tried upon jury trial in the Second 
Judicial District, Weber County, State of Utah, before the 
Honorable Charles E. Cowley, Judge, presiding. He was 
convicted of the charge of issuing a check against insuffi-
cient funds with intent to defraud, in violation of 76-20-11, 
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U. C. A. 1953, and sentenced to an indeterminate term of 
not to exceed five years in the State Prison. The sentence 
was to run concurrently with another sentence of ten years 
to life given by the same court theretofore for the crime 
of rape (State v. Myers, 385 P. 2d 609 (1963)). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent contends that the appellant's convic-
tion should be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondent submits the following statement of 
facts as being more in keeping with the requirement that 
the facts on appeal be reviewed in a light most favorable 
to the jury's verdict, and also as more accurately reflecting 
what actually transpired at the trial. 
On November 21, 1962, the appellant went to Brown-
ing Chevrolet Motors Company in Ogden, Utah, and dis-
cussed with a salesman for the company, Mr. Ciscowski, 
the purchase of a Chevrolet automobile (R. 7). After a 
motor vehicle had been agreed upon by the appellant, the 
salesman and the appellant went into the sales manager's 
office (R. 9). The sales manager was Mr. Earl Pierson 
(R. 29). The appellant indicated a desire to finance the 
purchase of the motor vehicle through a bank in Morgan, 
Utah (R. 10), and after discussing the purchase of the 
motor vehicle he left to go to Morgan to work out the 
financing arrangements with the bank (R. 30). Approxi-
mately two hours later the appellant returned with papers 
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from the bank in Morgan, covering the financing of the 
automobile (R. 30). The arrangements for the financing 
of the vehicle were that the appellant would pay one-third 
of the purchase price in cash and the bank in Morgan, Utah 
would pay the balance, and the appellant would pay the 
bank for the loan made to purchase the vehicle. 
At the time of returning to the Browning Chevrolet 
Company, the appellant executed a check payable to Brown-
ing Chevrolet Company in the sum of $765.29 (State Ex-
hibit A, R. 12 and 31). At the time of executing the check, 
the appellant told the salesman and sales manager that he 
had an account at the bank in Morgan (R. 11, 31). The 
sales manager, Mr. Pierson, called the bank in Morgan 
concerning the contract with the bank, but never discussed 
whether or not the appellant had a check account with the 
bank (R. 35). The check was presented by Browning Mo .. 
tor Company in the due course of business to its correspon-
dent bank (Bank of Ben Lomond in Ogden), and there-
after to the First National Bank of Morgan, Utah. The 
check was returned marked "No account" (Exhibit A). 
At the time of trial the salesman, sales manager and 
general manager of Browning Chevrolet Company testified 
that no payment had been made on the check (R. 32, 44), 
and that no effort had been made by the appellant to make 
the check good (R. 99). The check was received by Mr. 
Pierson from the appellant after 5 :00 P.M. on the 21st of 
November, 1962, and was presented to the bank in Morgan 
on November 28, 1962. November 24th and 25th, interven-
ing days from the time of issue until the time of present-
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ment at the drawee bank, were a Saturday and Sunday (R. 
50-51). Mr. Ciscowski, the salesman, and Mr. Pierson, the 
sales manager, testified that there was no agreement of 
any kind with the appellant not to present the check in the 
regular course of business to the drawee bank, and that 
there was no agreement to hold it until the appellant could 
cover the check. Mr. Grant Francis, the cashier of the 
First National Bank of Morgan, Utah, testified that the 
appellant's bank account at that bank had been terminated 
on June 14, 1962, and that no money was on deposit when 
the check was received for payment or had there been any 
tender of a deposit subsequently. He further indicated that 
on November 21, 1962, the date upon which the appellant 
purchased the vehicle from Browning Motors, that the 
appellant came to his bank to obtain financing for the pur-
chase of the vehicle. The appellant asked Mr. Francis what 
would happen if he wrote a check on the bank for the 
amount of the down payment. Mr. Francis indicated that 
since he had no account, that the check would be dishonored 
(R. 47, 48). Mr. Francis further testified that there was 
no discussion between the appellant and himself concern-
ing the honoring of the check drawn on the First National 
Bank of Morgan, Utah, to cover the amount of the down 
payment. There were no arrangements made to hold the 
check (R. 62), and the appellant's credit in a livestock ac-
count had also been terminated (R. 56). 
The evidence at trial disclosed that the appellant had 
presented checks subsequent to his account being closed 
which were honored by the bank in Morgan. These, how-
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ever, were honored because the appellant had deposited 
money at the teller's window to cover the checks when pre-
sented ( R. 54) . It was also shown that the appellant had 
written six other checks subsequent to the termination of 
his account which were dishonored by the bank (R. 65). 
The appellant testified that he executed the check knowing 
that he had no account at the bank in Morgan, but upon 
an understanding with the payee, Browning Motor Com-
pany, that the check would not be presented for payment 
for from two to three weeks so that the appellant could 
sell some cattle to cover the amount of the down payment. 
Such an arrangement did not occur according to the offi-
cers and employees of the payee. 
Based on the above evidence, the jury found the appel-
lant guilty and in due course the trial court committed the 
appellant to the State Prison for the indeterminate period 
provided by law. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION IN DENYING APPELLANT'S 
MOTION FOR A MISTRIAL. 
During the course of the trial the District Attorney 
asked a witness the following question : 
"Q. Mr. Pierson, would you have sold this car 
if you had known this was a bum check?" 
Objection was made and the trial court sustained the ob-
jection (R. 39). Thereafter, outside the presence of the 
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jury, appellant made a motion for a mistrial, which the 
trial court denied. The appellant contends it was reversible 
error not to grant the motion for mistrial. In doing so, 
appellant argues that the question, although no answer 
was elicited, implies that the District Attorney had inves-
tigated the matter and determined the check to be worth-
less. The whole issue is, at the most, innocuous. The evi-
dence presented at trial showed the check was dishonored 
on presentment, which even the appellant admitted. It was 
further shown that the check was never honored; conse-
quently the characterization, although improper, could 
hardly be deemed prejudicial. 
It is well settled that a motion for mistrial is directed 
to the sound discretion of the trial court, 23A C. J. S., 
Criminal Law, Sec. 1116, p. 233; People v. Rhoades, 209 P. 
2d 33 (Cal. App.) and, further, it has been stated that the 
court should not be in a hurry to grant a mistrial in the 
absence of a clear showing of the likelihood of prejudice. 
In Commonwealth v. Edgerton, 200 Mass. 318, 86 N. E. 
768, the court said: 
"The court 'ought not to be swift to grant a 
new trial on account of irregularities not attended 
with any intentional wrong, and where it is made 
satisfactorily to appear that the party complaining 
has not and could not have sustained any injury 
from them.' " 
Thus, clearly in absence of a showing of definite prej-
udice, the court cannot be said to have abused its discre-
tion. In Abbott, Criminal Trial Practice, 4th Ed., Sec. 303, 
p. 559, it is noted: 
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"* * * and if no improper testimony is in 
fact given, the allowance of improper questions is 
immaterial." 
In the instant case the court didn't even allow the 
witness to answer. 
The appellant contends that there was a previous ob-
jection on an identical statement which the court had sus-
tained. This mis-states the record. The record reflects 
that previous to the incident the appellant contends should 
have required a mistrial, the following occurred, (R. 32) : 
"Q. Tell us what you did when the check 
bounced? 
"A. When the check came back, then of course 
they tried to make collection on the check. 
"MR. BINGHAM: I will object. He can say 
what he did but not what the organization did. 
"THE COURT: All right." 
Thus, the question was not the same, and no objection was 
made to the form of the question on the basis of improper 
characterization. Consequently, this argument is equally 
unmeritorious. This court must weigh for specific preju-
dice (77-42-1, U. C. A. 1953); the state of the record clearly 
shows none that would warrant reversal. 
Finally, appellant's argument that the court should 
have instructed the jury to disregard the question is merely 
make weight. No request for instruction was made which 
is a prerequisite to a claim of error, State v. Rowley, 386 
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P. 2d 126 (Utah 1963). Appellant has no basis for a new 
trial on this point. 
POINT II. 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO WAR-
RANT THE JURY IN FINDING THE APPEL-
LANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED. 
The appellant contends that the evidence was such 
that the jury could not find him guilty beyond all reason-
able doubt. In this regard, the evidence must be weighed 
in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict. State v. 
Ward, 10 U. 2d 34, 347 P. 2d 865 (1959). When the evi-
dence is so viewed, it is clear that there was ample evidence 
which would warrant the jury in finding the accused guilty 
beyond all reasonable doubt. 
The evidence discloses that on the 21st day of Novem-
ber, 1962, the appellant executed Exhibit A, being a check 
in the sum of $765.29, payable to the Browning Chevrolet 
Company and drawn upon First National Bank of Morgan, 
Utah (R. 12, 31). He told the salesman and sales manager 
for the payee that he had an account in the bank upon 
which the check was drawn (R. 31). However, the appel-
lant's account in the bank had been terminated on June 14, 
1962 (R. 45). The appellant never made any deposit to 
cover the check issued with the drawee bank. Further, the 
record discloses that the appellant was expressly warned 
by the bank cashier that if he wrote the check on his ac-
count that the check would not be honored (R. 48). Al-
though the appellant contended that there was an agree-
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ment to the effect that the check would be held and not 
negotiated by the payee for a period of time sufficient to 
allow him to make a deposit, both the salesman, Mr. Cis-
cowski, and the sales manager testified that there was no 
agreement that the check would be withheld from present-
ment in the due course of business (R. 26, 94, 98). Fur-
ther, both of the employees of Browning Chevrolet Com-
pany testified that there was no offer to make payment 
subsequent to default on the check. Although there was 
some evidence presented that at least two checks had been 
paid by the First National Bank of Morgan subsequent to 
the closing of the appellant's account, these checks were 
paid only when the appellant left the money with the teller 
to cover the payment of the checks. Further, approximately 
six checks had been written since the closing of the account 
which had been dishonored because appellant had not de-
posited any funds to cover their payment. 
The appellant contends that the delay in the present-
ment of the check for payment lends support to his posi-
tion that there was an agreement between the parties that 
the check would not be immediately payable. However, the 
evidence discloses that the check was given by the appellant 
to the payee after 5:00 P.M. on the 21st of November, 
1962. The first time the check could have been presented 
for negotiation was on November 22, 1962. The check was 
presented for collection to the local bank of the payee. It 
was then sent through to the Salt Lake Clearing House, 
and arrived for payment at the drawee bank in :Morgan 
on the 28th of November, 1962. In the interim, there 
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were two days which comprised a weekend during which 
no banking business would be done. As a consequence, it 
does not appear that there was any unusual delay such 
as to overcome the jury's determination that there was no 
agreement to hold back the check. Further, since it was 
the appellant's contention that the agreement to hold the 
check was to be for two to three weeks, any delay of a day 
or two would hardly be sufficient to corroborate his posi-
tion on the matter. 
Additionally, it appeared that the appellant owed sub-
stantial sums of money (R. 78), and knew that he had no 
money in the bank at the time the check was issued (R. 80). 
In this case the jury had an opportunity to view the 
witnesses, observe their conduct and to weigh the conten-
tions of the witnesses. The evidence in this instance is, 
consequently, sufficient to warrant the jury in finding 
the accused guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. State V. 
Tinnin, 64 Utah 587, 232 Pac. 543; State v. Prettyman, 
113 Utah 36, 191 P. 2d 142. 
There is, therefore, no merit to the appellant's con-
tention that the evidence was insufficient to allow the jury 
to find the appellant guilty beyond all reasonable doubt. 
CONCLUSION 
The issues raised on appeal in the instant case are 
patently unmeritorious. The evidence presented to the 
jury was overwhelming as to the accused's guilt, and was 
amply sufficient to sustain the jury's verdict. As a con-
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sequence, there is no basis for reversal for insufficiency of 
the evidence. The appellant's contention that the court 
should have granted a mistrial can only be characterized 
as an attempt to make a mountain out of a molehill. 
This court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A. PRATT KESLER, 
Attorney General, 
RONALD N. BOYCE, 
Chief Assistant 
Attorney General, 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
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